Why Auburn gave up a touchdown to Brock Bowers in the 4th quarter

The biggest debate since the Auburn-Georgia game concluded: What happened in the 4th quarter? Why was Auburn not covering Georgia star tight end Brock Bowers more closely? Or were they?

I see this is a big topic this morning, well, it has been since it happened. I know how to read a room. Let’s talk through this and why it might have happened.

As always, this is one man’s opinion. This is how I saw it play out after going back through and studying.

The set up play

— Georgia wide receiver Ladd McConkey was not full speed, I don’t think. I had heard earlier in the week that he was not full speed and was questionable. Well, he played, much to Nehemiah Pritchett’s dismay. If you remember, it was Pritchett who had trouble with McConkey before. This year, he kept the top on him, but McConkey’s presence was still a key part of the 4th quarter game plan for Georgia and offensive coordinator Mike Bobo. 

— By my count, there were at least 4 of the bench concept/corner routes/stick routes that hit against Auburn. After checking the stats, McConkey had 4 catches for 38 yards, so that lines up. Those stats don’t sound that dangerous, but each of those plays went for a first down.. and usually on 3rd down. The play we are looking at was a 3rd and 10 conversion on what I am calling a sticks route. I’m not sure what the official name of it is.

— This particular play was not a bench concept (even though at least 2 of McConkey’s plays were) on 3rd and 10. Auburn is in man coverage. The inside receiver (Bowers) takes the nickel (Donovan Kaufman) across the field. We have talked about Kaufman’s limitations as a man coverage player. At some point, you don’t have a choice and have to roll the dice depending on what the offense is throwing at you.

— Pritchett is manning up McConkey on the outside. This looks like the sticks route that Auburn used to run effectively with Darvin Adams. Pritchett has inside positioning, which is good, but overruns on the break.. That was the plan of the route. In fact, and I am speculating, this could be somewhat of an option route for McConkey to break it off when he feels the corner beginning to overrun the play. I don’t know that for sure.

— Pritchett loses his footing with the excellent break from McConkey and it is yet another 3rd down conversion. So, the more this happened, the more Auburn would have to respect it.

— Bowers coming across the field here could have been thrown to. Notice Zion Puckett, in no way, can help with this play at safety. So, Auburn started creeping that safety over more to help contain this McConkey route.. Well, that just opened the middle of the field more for Bowers who was single-covered here. Georgia (Bobo) knew they could get this look again.. I think it was something similar on the touchdown play. 

Bowers touchdown

— All of this context for the play above matters because Ron Roberts knew Georgia would keep hammering this play until Auburn stopped it. They would do the same with Bowers, too. This is what play callers can do when they have more than one go-to guy… More than one guy they trust to get open in the pass concept that they call..

— The reason, in my opinion, Auburn didn’t “Bracket” or double cover Bowers in the end is because of this play, and about 4-5 more plays like it. How do we know what the call is? That is what I am confused about. It looks like influence to me. Influence by Georgia’s No. 84 and Georgia’s No. 19.

— PRE-SNAP: Bowers and McConkey are on the same side of the formation. Auburn essentially has 3 over 2 here in coverage. 2 players are over Bowers and McConkey while 1 is over the top. Immediately, the safety is probably worried about giving up the outside again to McConkey.

— POST-SNAP: McConkey runs an angle in and sits before running the whip. Bowers runs what looks like a 10 yard dig. For those 10 yards, Puckett is thinking he is about to run that same out concept. Auburn is in a zone look, so Eugene Asante triggers toward McConkey who comes into his hook zone. The safety has to come down and get to Bowers, which is a tough ask in this situation.. (It still has to be done).

— If Asante collisions Bowers, this play is totally different. Collision here means to knock Bowers off of his route. One of the main rules as a linebacker is to NEVER let a route cross your face without collisioning. Why?? With a collision, the route is slowed and gives time to the safety to come down and cover it. This is a key miscue of the play.

— I give just as much credit to Bobo and Georgia’s playmakers as I do to the play call or scheme that Roberts was running.. It’s called “setting up.” If you can’t do that on this level, you can’t be on this level. Auburn was stretched to its end on defense in my opinion. The setup of the plays to this point certainly had an influence on Puckett in his drop.

— Do I take my chances on double “bracketing” Bowers here? I might.. Hindsight is 20-20. Roberts trusted his defense to keep the top on as it had all day. Roberts knew he had to find a way to get his defense off the field. He felt that covering the entire field rather than keying on one of these two players was the best bet. Personally, I don’t fully fault him for this. 

— Also, don’t forget, Auburn’s offensive was given a FAIR shot at tying the game and winning the game. That cannot be lost in this, in my opinion.

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